Abstract. HIGHT is a 32-round block cipher with a 64-bit block size and a 128-bit user key, which was proposed at CHES '06 for low-resource applications like RFID. In this paper, we present an impossible differential attack on 25-round HIGHT, a related-key rectangle attack on 26-round HIGHT, and finally a related-key impossible differential attack on 28-round HIGHT. Our result suggests that the safety margin of HIGHT decreases from the originally expected thirteen rounds to about four rounds now.
Introduction
Recently, cryptography for embedded and ubiquitous computing systems receives an extensive research attention. At CHES '06, Hong et al. [9] presented a 32-round block cipher with a 64-bit block size and a 128-bit user key, known as HIGHT. Due to the simple byte-oriented operations involved, HIGHT is especially efficient in hardware implementations, much faster than those [7, 8] of AES [19] , and it is most suitable for various real-life resource-constrained application environments, such as RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) systems. The HIGHT proposers also analysed its security against various existing cryptanalytic attacks; they described a differential attack [6] , a linear attack [18] and a boomerang attack [20] on 13-round HIGHT, a truncated differential attack [14] and a saturation attack [17] on 16-round HIGHT, an impossible differential attack [2, 15] on 18-round HIGHT, and finally a related-key [1, 12] boomerang attack [5] on 19-round HIGHT.
In this paper, we further analyse the security of HIGHT. We exploit 16-round impossible differentials such that we can devise an impossible differential attack on 25-round HIGHT; we also exploit 18-round related-key rectangle distinguishers with probability 2 −92. 4 , which can enable us to mount a related-key rectangle attack on 26-round HIGHT. Finally, we exploit 19-round related-key impossible differentials that can be used to mount a related-key impossible differential attack on 28-round HIGHT.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we briefly describe some notation and the HIGHT block cipher. In Sections 3 and 4, we present our cryptanalytic results. Section 5 concludes this paper.
Preliminaries

Notation
We will use the following notation throughout this paper. -e j,∼ : a byte that has zeros in bits 0 to j − 1, a one in bit j and indeterminate values in bits (j + 1) to 7 -e j,∼ : a byte that has zeros in bits 0 to j and indeterminate values in bits (j + 1) to 7 -? : an arbitrary byte, where two bytes represented by the ? symbol may be different
The notion of difference used throughout this paper is with respect to the ⊕ operation. It is assumed that in a byte the rightmost bit is the least significant bit and referred as the 0-th bit, and the leftmost bit is the most significant bit and referred as the 7-th bit.
The HIGHT Block Cipher
HIGHT [9] takes as an input a 64-bit plaintext P , represented as eight bytes (P 7 , · · · , P 1 , P 0 ), and it has a total of 32 rounds. Let (X i−1,7 , X i− 1, 6 ,X i−1,5 , X i−1,4 , X i−1,3 , X i−1,2 , X i−1,1 , X i−1,0 ) denote the eight-byte input to Round i, and (X i, 7 , X i, 6 , X i, 5 , X i, 4 , X i,3 , X i,2 , X i,1 , X i,0 ) denote the eight-byte output of Round i, (1 ≤ i ≤ 32). The encryption procedure can be described as follows.
1. Perform the Initial Transformation: the eight-byte output (X 0,7 , X 0,6 , X 0,5 , X 0,4 , X 0,3 , X 0,2 , X 0,1 , X 0,0 ) = (P 7 , P 6 ⊕WK 3 , P 5 , P 4 WK 2 , P 3 , P 2 ⊕WK 1 , P 1 , P 0 WK 0 ).
For i = 1 to 32:
X i,0 = X i−1,7 ⊕ (F 0 (X i−1,6 ) SK 4i−1 ), In the above description, SK i (0 ≤ i ≤ 127) are the round subkeys, WK j (0 ≤ j ≤ 7) are the whitening subkeys used in the initial and final transformation, the functions F 0 (·) and
Note that the first round is referred as Round 1. Fig. 1 depicts one encryption round of HIGHT.
The key schedule of HIGHT only accepts a 128-bit user key MK, represented as sixteen bytes (MK 15 , · · · , MK 1 , MK 0 ). The whitening subkeys WK j are generated as follows: WK j = MK j+12 for j = 0, 1, 2, 3, and WK j = MK j−4 for j = 4, 5, 6, 7. The round subkeys are generated as follows:
, where δ 16·i+j and δ 16·i+j+8 are public constants.
3 Impossible Differential Attack on 25-Round HIGHT
16-Round Impossible Differentials
We exploit certain 16-round impossible differentials: (e i,∼ , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (e 0,3,5,6,7 , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, e 7 ), where 1 ≤ i ≤ 7. Note that the 16-round differentials (e 7 , e 0,3,5,6,7 , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) → (0, e i,∼ , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) are also impossible. These 16-round impossible differentials are mainly because the following general property.
Property 1
The operation definitely preserves the least significant differences in the original positions, and may preserve the other differences in the original positions or propagate them to the more significant positions, but never to the less significant positions, while the ⊕ operation always preserves all the differences in their original positions.
The 16-round impossible differentials are built in a miss-in-the-middle manner [3] : a 8-round differential (e i,∼ , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) → (e i,∼ , ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?) with probability 1 is concatenated with another 8-round differential (e 0,∼ , 0, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?) ← (e 0,3,5,6,7 , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, e 7 ) with probability 1, but the leftmost bytes of the intermediate differences of these two differentials contradict one another. The input difference (e i,∼ , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) of the first 8-round differential propagates to a difference (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, e i,∼ ) after one round of HIGHT, which then propagates to a difference (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, ?, e i,∼ , 0) after another round. As a result, the difference (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, ?, e i,∼ , 0) finally propagates to a difference (e i,∼ , ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?) after the following six rounds. On the other hand, when we roll back the difference (e 0,3,5,6,7 , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, e 7 ) through one round of HIGHT in the reverse direction, then we will definitely get the difference (0, e 0,3,5,6,7 , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), as the difference e 0,3,5,6,7 becomes (e 0,3,5,6,7 ≪ 1) ⊕ (e 0,3,5,6,7 ≪ 2) ⊕ (e 0,3,5,6,7 ≪ 7) = e 0,1,4,6,7 ⊕ e 0,1,2,5,7 ⊕ e 2,4,5,6,7 = e 7 after the F 0 function. The difference (0, e 0,3,5,6,7 , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) propagates to a difference (e 0,∼ , 0, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?) when we roll it back through seven more rounds. Now a contradiction occurs if i = 0, as the leftmost byte difference of one of the two intermediate differences is e i,∼ while the leftmost byte difference of the other is e 0,∼ .
Attacking Rounds 6-30
HIGHT has a Feistel structure with four branches, which can be efficiently implemented. However, we observe this round structure is much weaker than a regular Feistel structure, in terms of security. Property 2 suggests that to get a byte value (or difference) of the input to a round we need not guess all the twelve 8-bit subkeys in its following three rounds; and we can determine whether a candidate pair is a right pair byte by byte, and even bit by bit, due to the round struture and the operations involved. This plays an important role in our attacks.
We can use the 16-round impossible differentials to break 25-round HIGHT. Here, we attack Rounds 6 to 30 of HIGHT with the final transformation only. The attack procedure is as follows. Partially encrypt every remaining (P i , P j ) with (SK 22 , SK 27 ) to get the two bytes (7, 0) 
computations.
Step 5 has about 2 122.24 computations. Therefore, the attack has a total time complexity of about 2 126.75 25-round HIGHT computations.
Related-Key Cryptanalysis of Reduced HIGHT
A related-key attack [1, 12] assumes that the attacker knows the differences between one or more pairs of unknown keys. In this section, we present a related-key rectangle attack on 26-round HIGHT, and a related-key impossible differential attack on 28-round HIGHT.
Related-Key Rectangle Attack on 26-Round HIGHT
A related-key rectangle attack [5, 10, 13] is a combination of a related-key attack and a rectangle attack [4] ; it is based on a related-key rectangle distinguisher, which treats a block cipher E : {0,
18-Round Related-Key Rectangle Distinguishers of HIGHT Let E 0 denote Rounds 3 to 12, and E 1 denote Rounds 13 to 20. The first related-key differential for this 18-round distinguisher is the following 10-round related-key differential α → β with probability 2 −12 for E 0 : (e 1,3,5 , e 0,1,6 , e 7 , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) → (0, e 1, 5, 6 , e 0,6,7 , e 7 , 0, 0, 0, 0) 2 , where the user key difference 7 , 0, 0). The second related-key differential is the following 8-round related-key differential γ → δ with probability 2 −9 for E 1 : (0, 0, 0, 0, e 2,5,6 , e 0,6,7 , e 7 , 0) → (e 7 , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, e 0,1,6 ) 3 , where the user key difference
We can compute a square sum of at least 6·(2
.98 for the probabilities of all the possible 10-round relatedkey differentials α → β for E 0 , as there are at least 6 (10-round related-key differential characteristics) with probability 2 −12 , at least 20 with probability 2 −13 , at least 20 with probability 2 −14 , and at least 72 with probability 2 −15 . We can also compute a square sum of at least 5 · (2
.42 for the probabilities of all the possible 8-round related-key differentials γ → δ for E 1 , as there are at least 5 (8-round related-key differential characteristics) with probability 2 −9 , at least 18 with probability 2 −10 , and at least 40 with probability 2 −11 . Therefore, we can learn that this 18-round related-key rectangle distinguisher has a probability of at least 2 −19.98 · 2 −14.42 · 2 −64 = 2 −98. 4 for the correct key, while it has a probability of 2 −128 for a wrong key. We can further improve it by counting many possible 8-round related-key differentials γ → δ for every γ → δ for E 1 . We count those that only have the output difference (e 7 , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, ∆X 21,0 ) different from the 8-round differential γ → δ; an analysis of this one-round differentials reveals that there are 4 possible ∆X 21,0 (i.e., e 0,1,6 , e 0,6 , e 0,6,7 , e 0,1,6,7 ) with probability 2 −3 , 4 possible ∆X 21,0 with probability 2 −4 , 4 possible ∆X 21,0 with probability 2 −5 , 4 possible ∆X 21,0 with probability 2 −6 , and 8 possible ∆X 21,0 with probability 2 −7 . Actually, these are all the 24 possible output differences of the last one-round differentials; we denote them by the set S. As a result, the distinguisher now has a probability of at least for the correct key, while it has a probability of (24·2 −64 ) 2 ≈ 2 −118.83 for a wrong key. Similar related-key rectangle distinguishers exist for some other series of 18 rounds.
Attacking Rounds 1-26 To get the difference (e 1,3,5 , e 0,1,6 , e 7 , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) just before Round 3, the input difference to Round 1 must have the form (?, e 0,∼ , ?, e 0,∼ , e 7 , 0, 0, 0), with 31 bits definitely being zero differences. On the other hand, the output difference (e 7 , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, x) of this distinguisher will propagate to a difference (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, ?, x, e 7 ) just after Round 21, where x ∈ S, which will then propagate to a difference (0, 0, 0, ?, ?, e 0,∼ , e 7 , 0) just after Round 22, to a difference (0, ?, ?, ?, e 0,∼ , e 7 , 0, e 7 ) just after Round 23 (due to the subkey difference in Round 23), and a difference (?, ?, ?, e 0,∼ , e 7 , e 2,∼ , e 7 ) just after Round 24. This property allows us to use the early abort technique [16] to break Rounds 21 and 24; the main idea of the early abort technique is to partially determine whether or not a candidate quartet in a rectangle attack is valid earlier than usual; if not, we can discard it immediately, which results in less computations in the subsequent steps and may allow us to break more rounds by guessing the subkeys involved, depending on how many candidates are remaining.
The above analysis enables us to give a related-key rectangle attack on the first 26 rounds of HIGHT with the final transformation only, after noting that the same 64 user key bits are used in Rounds 1, 2, 25 and 26 as well as the final transformation. With a success probability of 80%, the attack requires 2 49.7 chosen plaintexts, and has a time complexity of 2 121.37 26-round HIGHT computations. See the Appendix A for the detailed attack procedure.
Related-Key Impossible Differential Attack on 28-Round HIGHT
19-Round Related-Key Impossible Differentials We exploit certain 19-round related-key impossible differentials: (e 7 , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, e 0,∼ ), where the user key difference (∆MK 15 , · · · , ∆MK 1 , ∆MK 0 ) is (0, e 7 , 0, · · · , 0), which start from Round 8 and end at Round 26. They are also built in a miss-in-the-middle manner: a 12-round related-key differential with probability 1 is concatenated with a 7-round related-key differential with probability 1, where the second right byte of the output difference of the 12-round related-key differential is e 0,∼ , and the second right byte of the difference of the 7-round related-key differential is e 0,∼ , which contradict with each other.
Attacking Rounds 3-30 Similar to that given in Section 3.2, the 19-round related-key impossible differentials can be used to break the 28 rounds from Rounds 3 to 30 of HIGHT with only the final transformation; the main difference between them lies in that here we compute the related-key difference between a pair of data. The attack procedure is as follows. There is a 25-bit filtering condition on the ciphertext pairs in Step 2, and a 8-bit filtering condition in each of Steps 3-(a)∼(d) and Steps 4-(a)∼(e). Hence, for every key guess, it is expected about 2 98 · 2 −25−8×8 = 2 9 plaintext pairs remain after Step 4-(d), and about 2 120
.12 guesses of the 120 key bits are recorded in Step 4-(e). Thus, the expected number of suggested wrong keys in Step 5 is about 2 −192 · 2 117.12+8 = 2 −66.88 . Thus, the correct key can be determined.
Step 3 has about 2 · 2
.19 computations, where 1 2 means the average fraction of the guessed keys that are tested in a step.
Step 4 has about
Step 5 has about 2 125.12 computations. Therefore, the attack has a total time complexity of about 2 125.99 28-round HIGHT computations.
Conclusions
The HIGHT block cipher was proposed for low-resource devices at CHES '06.
In this paper, we present an impossible differential attack on 25-round HIGHT, a related-key rectangle attack on 26-round HIGHT and a related-key impossible differential attack on 28-round HIGHT. Like most cryptanalytic attacks on block ciphers, the presented attacks are theoretical, but they suggest that the reduced versions of HIGHT are less secure than they should be. These are better than any previously known cryptanalytic results on HIGHT in terms of the numbers of attacked rounds.
A Procedure of the Related-Key Rectangle Attack on 26-Round HIGHT
33 , where in each structure the 31 bit positions (0-31) of P i,l are fixed, and the remaining 33 bit positions take all the possible values. In a chosen plaintext attack scenario, obtain the ciphertexts 
) pass this test, record them, and go to Step 3; otherwise, repeat Step 2 with another guess. 
) with SK 95,0−l to get the least significant (l + 1) bits of the bytes 
) with SK 92,0−l to get the least significant (l + 1) bits of the bytes (1) For every iteration in Step 3-(b) , the probability that a quartet meets the filtering condition is (2 −1 ) 2 = 2 −2 , so it follows that all the 2 72 guesses of (MK 0 , · · · , MK 7 , MK 10 ) will past Step 3, and for a wrong guess it is expected about 2 55.4 · 2 −2×8 = 2 39.4 quartets remain after Step 3. For every iteration in Step 4-(b), the probability that a quartet meets the filtering condition is also 2 −2 , so it is expected that all the 2 88 guesses of (MK 0 , · · · , MK 7 , MK 9 , MK 10 , MK 13 ) will past this step, and for a wrong guess about 2 39.4 · 2 −2×8 = 2 23.4 quartets remain after Step 4. For every iteration in , the probability that a quartet meets the filtering condition is 2 −2 , so for a wrong guess about 2 23.4 · 2 −2×5 = 2 13.4 quartets remain after Step 5. In
Step 6, the probability that a quartet meets the filtering condition is also In
Step 8, it is expected that about 2 95.4 ·2 −92.4 = 8 quartets pass the filtering condition for the correct key, and the probability that 6 or more quartets pass the test for the correct key guess is approximately 
